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The unconditional expectation of social welfare is often
used to assess alternative macroeconomic policy rules in
applied quantitative research. This paper provides a detailed
analysis of such policies. It sets out the unconditionally opti-
mal (UO) policy problem and derives a linear-quadratic (LQ)
version of that problem that approximates the exact non-linear
problem. The properties of UO policies are analyzed through a
series of examples and contrasted with the timeless perspective
(TP), exposited in Benigno and Woodford (2012). Some sub-
stantive implications for optimal monetary policy are explored.
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1. Introduction
DSGE models can be diﬃcult to analyze in their non-linear form,
so a linear-quadratic (LQ) approximation is often adopted. That
approach has been extended by Sutherland (2002), Benigno and
Woodford (2004, 2005, 2006b), and many others in the context
of speciﬁc models. More recently, Benigno and Woodford (2012)
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demonstrate that the LQ approach can be applied quite generally to
optimal policy problems. They show that if that approximation is
performed around the optimal steady state, the solution to the LQ
problem represents a ﬁrst-order approximation to the (non-linear)
optimal policy. The steady state is optimal in the sense that it max-
imizes the original non-linear objective function with respect to the
original non-linear structural constraints of the model. In particu-
lar, Benigno and Woodford (2012) show that it is possible to apply
the LQ method to a model where the government searches for an
optimal policy from a timeless perspective (TP). Moreover, their
method delivers a pure second-order approximation to TP social wel-
fare which permits one to rank alternative policies from a timeless
perspective.1
One objective of this paper is to show that it is also possible to
apply an LQ approach to the case where a policymaker maximizes
the unconditional expectation of social welfare. Precisely, we will
show that an LQ approximation to the unconditional expectation of
social welfare around the unconditionally optimal (UO) steady state
will also generate a welfare function with purely second-order terms.
The solution of that LQ-UO problem yields a ﬁrst-order approxima-
tion to the policy which maximizes the unconditional expectation of
social welfare. Moreover, a pure second-order welfare function can
be obtained and used to measure the performance of simple policy
rules from an UO perspective.
The more important objective of the paper is to oﬀer a detailed
analysis of UO policies since that is lacking in the literature, despite
the prevalence of the UO perspective in quantitative macroeconomic
research. For example, Taylor (1979) suggested that, in quantita-
tive theoretical investigations under rational expectations, macro-
economic stabilization policies ought to optimize the unconditional
expectation of the policymaker’s objective function. That perspec-
tive on policy assessment has been popular; some prominent exam-
ples include Whiteman (1986), Rotemberg and Woodford (1998),
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999), Woodford (1999b), Erceg, Hen-
derson, and Levin (2000), Kollman (2002), Kim and Henderson
(2005), and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007). More recently, many
1See also Kim and Kim (2007).
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researchers have adopted the TP in quantitative and theoretical
research. Consequently, it will be useful to compare UO and TP
approaches in what follows in order to highlight the key features of
these diﬀering perspectives on optimal policy.
The potential attractions of unconditionally optimal policy, as
opposed to the timelessly optimal policy, are pursued in Jensen and
McCallum (2010). The timeless perspective minimizes the variance
but does not account for the initial conditions (see Woodford 2002,
p. 508). However, the distribution of initial conditions depends on
the policy adopted in preceding periods. That relation is explicitly
taken into account by the unconditionally optimal approach. We
demonstrate through a number of examples that adopting the uncon-
ditionally optimal methodology internalizes the initial distribution
and delivers a policy which is best on average. That is, UO policy
performs better on average precisely because it takes into considera-
tion the initial conditions. UO policy is optimal given that a similar
policy choice was made by past policymakers. Hence, the principal
diﬀerence between TP policy and UO policy is that the former takes
the distribution of initial conditions as given and ignores impact of
policy on them in its design. In section 3 we explore in depth the
fundamental reasons why UO and TP policies diﬀer. We also extend
Jensen and McCallum (2010) by applying the UO methodology to
a DSGE model with no forward-looking constraints on the policy
problem. That provides a very clear example of what internalizing
initial conditions actually means.
This paper also highlights important diﬀerences between UO and
TP policies when the steady state is distorted. Jensen and McCallum
(2010) compare UO (what they call “optimal continuation” policies)
with TP policies, when the steady state is eﬃcient. In that case, it
is shown that the form of the welfare function to be optimized is
the same across programs. Here we show that the corresponding LQ
problems can be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent when the steady state is dis-
torted. We ﬁnd that UO and TP approaches imply diﬀerent steady
states, diﬀerent arguments in the quadratic social welfare function,
and diﬀerent linear dynamic constraints. Even the number of non-
degenerate dynamic constraints may diﬀer across the TP and UO
policy problems.
To design our algorithm, we extend the methodology of Dam-
janovic, Damjanovic, and Nolan (henceforth DDN) (2008), which
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derives the ﬁrst-order necessary conditions for the policy optimiz-
ing the unconditional expectation of welfare.2 Then, similar to
Judd (1999) and Benigno and Woodford (2012), the linear-quadratic
approximation is done around the optimal deterministic steady
state; in our case, around the unconditionally optimal steady-state,
and in Benigno and Woodford’s case, the timeless-perspective (TP)
steady state.3
As a result, we develop a useful approach for constructing the
pure second-order approximation to unconditional welfare. Since
this measure can be presented in the form of a linear combination
of the second moments, one can apply the Anderson et al. (1996)
algorithm, which has good convergence properties. Consequently, it
is also straightforward numerically to analyze policies from a UO
perspective.
A speciﬁc application of the approach is provided employing the
canonical New Keynesian model. A number of insights emerge. First,
unconditionally optimal monetary policy is characterized by trend
inﬂation. That trend in inﬂation complicates the linear quadratiﬁca-
tion.4 That explains a second insight: The second-order approximate
loss function is no longer deﬁned solely over terms in output and
inﬂation as found in DDN (2008) for the non-distorted steady-state
case. However, the loss function that one obtains is easily interpreted
in light of the underlying distortions in the economy. The approxi-
mate loss function is used to evaluate and rank diﬀerent simple rules
for monetary policy (i.e., the nominal interest rate). The welfare
implications of nominal income targeting versus inﬂation targeting
are explored, and our results are contrasted with some of those of
Kim and Henderson (2005).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we
recall the basic setup of the problem and the necessary ﬁrst-order
conditions for the optimal steady state.5 In section 3 we discuss
further and contrast the attractions of UO and TP policies. It is
2See also Whiteman (1986), Blake (2001), and Jensen and McCallum (2002),
(2010).
3See also Sutherland (2002), Debortoli and Nunes (2006), and Levine, Pearl-
man, and Pierse (2008).
4As shown in Ascari and Ropele (2007) and Damjanovic and Nolan (2010).
5That is the only section which overlaps with DDN (2008). Moreover, here we
provide a new derivation of the UO policy problem.
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shown in section 4 that one can derive a purely quadratic approx-
imation to the unconditional expectation of the objective function.
In section 5 a canonical New Keynesian, Calvo price-setting model
is set up. Section 6 formalizes the policy problem and demonstrates
the application of the various steps in the approach of section 4.
There is then a brief discussion of the implications for optimal mon-
etary policy when the steady state is distorted and the authorities
are optimizing over the unconditional loss function. We also contrast
the linear-quadratic form of UO and TP approaches, including the
diﬀerence in the point of approximation. In section 7 we use the
unconditional welfare criterion to explore brieﬂy the impact of dif-
ferent simple rules for monetary policy. There is also a short discus-
sion of optimal monetary policy following productivity and markup
shocks under TP and UO policies. Section 8 oﬀers some conclusions.
Appendices contain proofs and details of key derivations.
2. The General UO Problem
Consider a discounted loss function of the form
Lt = (1 − β)Et
∞∑
j=0
βjl(xt+j), (1)
where Et is the expectations operator conditional on information up
through date t, β is the time discount factor, l(xt+j) is the period
loss function, and xt is a vector of target variables. Speciﬁcally,
xt = [Zt, zt, it] , where Zt is a vector of predetermined endogenous
variables (lags of variables that are included in zt and it); zt is a vec-
tor of non-predetermined endogenous variables (including “jump”
variables), the value of which will generally depend upon both pol-
icy actions and exogenous disturbances at date t; and it is a vector
of policy instruments, the value of which is chosen in period t. Let
μt denote a vector of exogenous disturbances. For simplicity, assume
that μt is a function of primary i.i.d. shocks, (ei)
t
−∞.
Further, let the evolution of the endogenous variables zt and Zt
be determined by a system of simultaneous equations,
EtF (xt+1,xt, μt) = 0. (2)
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Let us further assume, following Taylor (1979), that the policymaker
seeks to minimize the unconditional expectation of the loss func-
tion (1), subject to constraints, (2).6 That is, he or she searches for
a policy rule
ϕ (Etxt+1,xt, μt) = 0, (3)
such that
ϕ∗ = argminELt(ϕ), (4)
where E is the unconditional expectations operator. We call such a
policy “unconditionally optimal” and denote it “UO policy.”
Formally, the unconditional expectation of any function l(x) can
be represented in Lebesgue integral form as
Elt(xt(ϕ)) =
∫
lt(xt(ϕ, e))de,
where de is the Cartesian product probability measure of i.i.d. pri-
mary shocks with history, (det−k)
∞
k=0 . We emphasize that de is given
exogenously and does not change with policy.
2.1 Solution
The ﬁrst step is to formulate the non-linear policy problem and
identify the non-stochastic steady state around which approxima-
tion needs to take place. For this purpose we will use constraints (2)
and necessary ﬁrst-order conditions.
2.1.1 Necessary Conditions for an Optimum
Consider the following Lagrangian function which is implied by the
above optimal policy problem:
LUO ({yt,xt, μt}) = E (l (xt) + ξtF (yt,xt, μt) + ρt (xt+1 − yt)) , (5)
6Taylor’s approach may be interpreted as a recommendation: Policymakers
ought to seek to minimize the unconditional value of the loss function. This
appears partly, perhaps largely, in response to the issue of time inconsistency. See
Taylor (1979) for further discussion. McCallum (2005) is an interesting discussion
of these, and related, issues.
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where we deﬁne
yt = xt+1. (6)
We introduce deﬁnition (6) solely for presentational purposes. The
formulation of (5) is justiﬁed as follows. The Lagrangian is deﬁned
as a function of all variables in all periods of time. Constraints (2)
and (6) should be satisﬁed for all time periods and for any real-
ization of the history of the shocks, (ei)
t+1
−∞. In each period t for
each realization of the history e, we will have a pair of constraints
corresponding to (2) and (6) and a corresponding pair of Lagrange
multipliers (ξt (e) ; ρt(e)). We need to sum up all these constraints
across all possible histories of the shocks’ realizations and across
time. To that end, ﬁrst deﬁne Lt, which is the sum of all constraints
at time t, multiplied by their Lagrange multipliers:
Lt :=
∫
ξt (e)F (yt,xt, μt, e) + ρt (e) (xt+1 (e) − yt (e)) de. (7)
By deﬁnition, Lt is the unconditional expectation, and its value does
not depend on time. Thus, one may write
Lt = E (ξtF (yt,xt, μt) + ρt (xt+1 − yt)) . (8)
Now formally one can sum over time periods for any discount rate;
we use β for consistency. Thus, (1 − β)Et
∑∞
j=0 β
jLt = Lt, as Lt
represents the unconditional expectation which is independent of
time. Therefore expression (5) is the sum of the objective and all
the constraints multiplied by corresponding Lagrange multipliers.
DDN (2008) show that the necessary conditions for the optimal-
ity of policy, ϕ, is that it implies a path for the endogenous vari-
ables, xt and yt, and that there exist Lagrange multipliers, (ξt, ρt) ,
that together satisfy the ﬁrst-order conditions (9), (10) and con-
straints (2),7
∂H
∂xt
=
∂l (xt)
∂x
+ ξt
∂F (yt,xt, μt)
∂x
+ ρt−1 = 0; (9)
∂H
∂yt
= ξt
∂F (yt,xt, μt)
∂yt
− ρt = 0, (10)
7The notation ξF is a shorthand for the tensor product,
∑n
i=1 ξiFi.
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where H (yt,xt, μt) is the Hamiltonian for (5), such that
L (yt,xt, μt) = E (H (yt,xt, μt)) .
Judd (1999), Woodford (2002), and Benigno and Woodford
(2005) demonstrate very clearly that the choice of the steady state
is crucial (along with the solution concept for forward-looking policy
problems) in being able to obtain LQ approximations to general non-
linear, forward-looking policy problems. To choose the deterministic
steady state around which log-linearization takes place, one needs
to solve the system of ﬁrst-order conditions (9), (10) and constraints
(2). This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The steady state (X, ξ) is deﬁned by the system
(11)–(12):
F (X,X, μ) = 0; (11)
∂l (X)
∂xt
+ ξ
∂F (X,X, μ)
∂x
+ ξ
∂F (X,X, μ)
∂y
= 0, (12)
where X, ξ, and μ indicate the vectors of steady-state values of
endogenous variables, Lagrange multipliers, and the average value
of shocks, respectively.
We refer to (X, ξ) as the “unconditionally optimal steady state.”8
In the absence of shocks, solution (11) shows that uncondition-
ally optimal policy delivers the steady state with the highest level
of steady-state welfare “on average,” where the averaging is with
respect to the unconditional measure. It is worth emphasizing that
the TP approach discussed in, e.g., Woodford (2002) implies diﬀerent
ﬁrst-order conditions and therefore a diﬀerent center of approxima-
tion. That diﬀerence will be shown to lead to a diﬀerent optimal
monetary policy.
3. Comparing UO and TP
In this section we begin our analysis of UO and TP policies. Before
proceeding, it is noted that comparing TP and UO policies should
be done with care9: TP policies are optimal (and time consistent)
8It is assumed throughout that system (11) has a unique solution.
9The editor has emphasized this point to us.
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when one employs a TP welfare measure, and the same is true vis-
a`-vis UO policy. However, we will on occasion ask whether agents
would prefer to be situated in economies with TP or UO policies.10
3.1 TP Program and Social Time Discounting
The TP approach was deﬁned ﬁrst in Woodford (1999b), where a
mathematical description of the policy was provided via the ﬁrst-
order conditions for TP policy. One ﬁrst forms an appropriate
Lagrangian for the TP program:
LTP (yt,xt, μt) = Et
∞∑
j=0
βj
(
l (xt+j) + ξtF (yt+j,xt+j , μt+j)
+ ρt (xt+1+j − yt+j)
)
. (13)
The necessary ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to future variables
will be
∂LTP
∂xt
=
∂l (xt)
∂x
+ ξt
∂F (yt,xt, μt)
∂x
+
1
β
ρt−1 = 0; (14)
∂LTP
∂yt
= ξt
∂F (yt,xt, μt)
∂yt
− ρt = 0. (15)
Based on these relations, one concludes that TP policy coin-
cides with fully optimal Ramsey policy conditional on the econ-
omy starting from the TP-optimal steady state. Thus, (14), (15),
and (2) determine the TP optimal steady state. It is also the con-
vergence state of the fully optimal Ramsey policy, conditional on the
government possessing appropriate commitment technology.
Comparing the ﬁrst-order conditions for the UO program (9) and
(10) with those of the TP (14) and (15), one concludes that TP pol-
icy coincides with UO policy if the policymaker’s discount factor is
equal to unity, β = 1. Hence, the policymaker’s time discounting
is central to the diﬀering perspectives of UO and TP policies. We
explore these diﬀerences in a little more detail now.
10In much the same way as public ﬁnance theorists might inquire whether
agents would prefer to live in a world with Benthamite or Rawlsian tax and
redistribution policies.
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3.2 Policies Compared
One may compare TP and UO policies along two related dimensions.
First, which concept of optimality is more appropriate in normative
study of policy problems? Second, if actual policymakers are able
to commit, which of the two policies are preferable? Jensen and
McCallum (2010) pursue the ﬁrst of these, concluding that UO poli-
cies are more appropriate in many instances. We refer the reader
to their insightful discussion. Assuming both policies are achievable,
which policy ought a policymaker adopt? That is perhaps something
of a philosophical question.
Unconditionally optimal policy maximizes average utility, given
that all generations follow one rule. To design that rule, one takes
into account not only current actions but also the actions one would
have wished our predecessor policymakers to have followed; such a
rule would bequeath preferable initial conditions to the current poli-
cymakers. By the same token, whatever current policymakers would
have asked of our predecessors is what current policymakers under-
take to provide to future policymakers. Therefore the beneﬁts to the
current generation of the rule, due to past commitments, are traded
against costs associated in passing beneﬁts to future generations.
In other words, the UO methodology entails treating future genera-
tions the same as the current generation, or without any discounting
(β = 1). Of course, that idea is not new in economic philosophy.
According to Ramsey (1928), discounting future generations’
welfare is unethical. Harrod (1948) recommends that government
“correct” individuals’ savings decisions because they reﬂect positive
time discounting and a resulting “palpable improvidence.” In this
he agrees with Pigou (1932), who comments on agents’ “defective
telescopic faculty” as a reason why private discount rates are exces-
sive. In particular, Harrod argues that an individual will ex post
be grateful to a government which induces him or her to invest the
amount corresponding to a decision predicated on a zero discount
rate. Solow (1974) also argues that the social discount factor perhaps
should be higher than the private one.
More concretely, a recent example of the importance of time dis-
counting is in the area of environmental policy, where the current
generation is expected to invest in environmental protection for the
beneﬁt of future generations. The size of that investment crucially
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depends on the discount factor attached to the welfare of future
generations. Stern (2007, p. 31) proposed to “treat the welfare of
future generations on a par with our own,” which on a strict inter-
pretation is to set the discount factor equal to 1. The same view has
been expressed in Anand and Sen (2000) and many others.
Another reason for a “low” social discount factor follows from
the assumption that utility depends on past as well as present and
future variables. For example, good memories may make one hap-
pier. Strotz (1956) introduced that idea and Caplin and Leahy (2004)
show that, in such a setting, policymakers should be more patient
than private individuals.
In the next section a simple example is provided that highlights,
we think, the attractions, and diﬃculties, in implementing UO pol-
icy relative to TP policy. We show that it may be not altruism
towards future generations but rather considerate behavior of the
predecessors that makes UO policy more attractive. In particular,
in the following example, it is preferable for agents to live in a UO
world given that the previous generations acted under UO policy,
rather than living in a TP world inherited from TP predecessors.
These beneﬁts notwithstanding, there are costs in a transition to
UO policy, and some generation will have to bear them.
3.3 Treatment of the Initial Conditions
The central diﬀerence between UO and TP policies is in the treat-
ment of initial conditions. TP policy takes the initial conditions as
given and optimizes future losses accordingly. UO policy acknowl-
edges the fact that policy aﬀects the distribution of initial conditions
as well. To show the diﬀerence, we apply these diﬀering policies to a
simple model with only backward-looking constraints on policy—in
that case, the value of the state variable is the relevant “initial condi-
tion.” In this “backward-looking” model, the TP policy will coincide
with optimal Ramsey policy (i.e., one with discounting). UO policy
will give a diﬀerent outturn, which we describe below. Consider the
following example.
Example 1. The technological process is the following. Generation t
makes a costly investment Nt (like planting edible seeds). Generation
t + 1, consumes the fruit from the crop
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Ct+1 = At+1Nt, (16)
and makes an investment for the next generation. Here At+1 is an
index of productivity. Society is altruistic and cares about succeeding
generations applying a discount rate β to their welfare. So utility of
the current generation t is
Ut = log(Ct) − kNt + βUt+1, k > 0.
Upon integrating forward, social welfare is found to be
Ut =
∑
βt+s (log(Ct+s) − Nt+s) .
Then, on substituting in the production technology (16), the policy
maximand is
Ut =
∑
βt+s (log(At+s) + log(Nt+s−1) − Nt+s) . (17)
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to Nt is
∂Ut
∂Nt
= β
1
Nt
− 1 = 0.
Clearly, therefore, the Ramsey solution and the TP solution coincide
and Nt = β.
Now consider a rule for N that has applied for all time; it has
been followed by past generations and it will be followed by the
current and future generations. In that case, one seeks an optimal
choice, Nt = N for all t. Thus, utility becomes
U =
∑
βt+s (log(At+1) + log(N) − N) (18)
and the ﬁrst-order condition gives N = 1. One might inquire whether
or not one would wish to live in an economy with a TP policy or a
UO policy. In fact, the UO policy generates much larger utilities
for all generations. In this particular case, the gain in consump-
tion equivalent is exp(− log(β) − (1 − β)), which can vary from
0.5 percent if β is relatively large, say β = 0.9, to 6 percent for
β = 0.7.
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So one may assume that, given the choice, an individual would
prefer to live in an economy where the government runs a policy
corresponding to a higher social discount factor.
The diﬀerence in TP and UO policies can be explained by the
treatment of initial conditions. TP methodology considers Nt−1 as
given and treats it as a “term independent of policy.” UO method-
ology is designed as the best policy, conditional that it is accepted
by all generations, including generation t − 1. That is why Nt−1 is
taken into account.
However, in the present example, there are two major drawbacks
of the UO approach relating to transition and time consistency. If
a country decides to switch from TP to UO policy, the transition
generation will be worse oﬀ; they will inherit a lower investment left
by the previous generation but will be asked to invest more for the
sake of the next generation. Moreover, every generation irrespective
of their inheritance will have an incentive to deviate from UO policy,
switching to Ramsey policy (which coincides in this instance with
the TP). Therefore, UO policy is time inconsistent in the sense of
Kydland and Prescott (1977).
It is an open question whether one is able to identify actual
policies that may have been (approximately) optimal from an
unconditional perspective. However, there is circumstantial evidence
that sometimes transition costs are incurred following major policy
changes, that is, when the current generation is forced to suﬀer for
a better future. It happens during wartime. It also often appears
to happen during pension reform; all future generations will ben-
eﬁt from a less distorted economy if the current generation sacri-
ﬁces part of their pension beneﬁts. Despite the costly transition,
more than eighty countries recently undertook some degree of pen-
sion reform (see Holzmann and Hinz 2005). Moreover, although the
transition cost is clear in a deterministic environment, it may be
less visible, and therefore more politically implementable, when an
economy is subject to stochastic shocks and the favorable shocks
can compensate the present generation for lower investment made
by the previous generation.
So, with only backward-looking constraints, TP policy, unlike
UO policy, is in a sense “stable”; it is time consistent in the sense
of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and credible. However, matters are
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somewhat diﬀerent when forward-looking structural equations are
present, as we now discuss.
3.4 Forward-Looking Models
As Soderlind (1999) shows, the best time-invariant policy depends
on initial conditions at the time when the decision is made. More-
over, the initial conditions are changing over time so that there is
always an incentive to deviate from any time-invariant policy. DDN
(2008) show that UO policy maximizes objectives over all possible
initial conditions, which is presented as the history of the realiza-
tion of the exogenous shocks. UO policy acknowledges that the initial
conditions depend on the policy run by predecessors and internal-
izes this. Another feature of the UO policy is that it maximizes over
all initial conditions implied by the policy run by the same policy-
maker acting optimally in the past. In contrast, TP policy commits
to time-zero expectations in the same way (that is, with the same
functional form) as in the future. However, initial conditions are not
necessarily the steady state, but can be any state. What is key is
that TP does not internalize initial conditions. We now set these
diﬀerences out explicitly.
Any policy φ together with constraints (2) deﬁne choice variables
xt as a function of initial values and shocks et:
φ : {xt−1,et} → xt.
Therefore, policy φ generates a distribution of initial conditions,
Fφ(xt). The timeless-perspective methodology takes that distribu-
tion as given and ignores the fact that policy inﬂuences the distri-
bution of initial conditions. In particular, Woodford (2002, p. 509)
decomposes the objective function into two components:
L = Ldet + Lstab,
where Ldet depends on initial conditions, and Lstab depends only
on the responses to unexpected shocks. He explains that the TP
method minimizes Lstab and so does not internalize the inﬂuence of
policy on the distribution of initial conditions. Hence,
φTP = argminLstab(φ).
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UO policy takes the inﬂuence of φ on the distribution of initial
conditions into account. The simplest way to see this is by not-
ing that the distribution of Ldet depends on the policy which was
implemented by predecessors. In particular, Ldet can be completely
deﬁned once we know the complete history of shocks and the policy:
Ldet = Ldet(φ, et−). Therefore, UO policy is deﬁned as
φUO = argmin
(∫
Ldet(φ, et−)det− + Lstab(φ)
)
.
In other words, UO methodology internalizes the initial distri-
bution and delivers the policy which is best on average.
3.5 Stationarity
In contrast to the TP, UO policy induces stationarity. For exam-
ple, under the TP it is optimal to permit permanent increases in
debt and taxes following structural shocks under nominal rigidity
(see Benigno and Woodford 2004, 2006a, and Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe 2004). However, Horvath (2011) ﬁnds that in the log-linearized
unconditionally optimal economy, public debt converges to its steady
state following a shock. Clearly, the UO approach is not applicable
to non-stationary policies. Any policy which causes some variable to
evolve as a unit root would generate unlimited unconditional losses,
and such a policy would not be adopted by a policymaker with a
UO perspective.
An alternative measure of unconditionally optimal policy is pro-
posed in Benigno and Woodford (2012) in which the unconditional
expectations operator is applied to a stationary sub-space of all vari-
ables. The values and expected values of unit-root variables are
treated as initial conditions and therefore are classiﬁed as “terms
independent of policy,” or “t.i.p.” Speciﬁcally, all predetermined
variables are split into “trend” and “cyclical” components, where
the “trend” consists of all non-stationary variables. The uncondi-
tional measure is then applied to the “cyclical” component only.
How does this alternative UO policy diﬀer from the one developed
in the current paper? Consider two policies. Assume that they gen-
erate the same volatility of inﬂation. However, policy 1 (P1) induces
a unit root in output, while policy 2 (P2) induces stationary output
with ﬁnite volatility. According to UO policy as proposed in Benigno
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and Woodford (2012), P1 is to be preferred to P2 since the volatility
of output will be counted as part of trend output and will not have
an impact on the ranking of alternative, feasible policies. There-
fore, an economy with inﬁnitely volatile output will be preferred
to an economy with low output volatility, for a given volatility of
inﬂation.11
Alternatively, under the standard UO measure (as deﬁned in
section 2), P1 will be rejected in favor of P2. That is because
the rank of the “trend” sub-space depends on policy design and
will be internalized by the policymaker optimizing unconditional
losses.
4. The Possibility of Pure Second-Order Approximation
In this section we show that it is possible to construct a pure second-
order approximation to a general unconditional optimization prob-
lem (1), subject to constraints (2). We formulate it in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2. It is always possible to approximate unconditional
welfare up to second order around the UO steady state (X, ξ), deﬁned
by the system (11)–(12).
Proof. The value of the loss function El (xt) should not change
if combined with the unconditional expectation of the constraints
EF (yt, xt, μt). Thus, appendix 1 demonstrates that the second-
order approximation to this combination has a pure second-order
form. That is,
El (xt, μt) = E [l (xt) + ξF (yt, xt, μt)]
= EQl + ξEQF + t.i.p+ O3. (19)
The notation O3 denotes third- or higher-order terms. Ql and QF
are pure second-order terms of the log-approximation, around the
11To be clear, what matters for welfare is the discounted value of second
moments, which might be ﬁnite even if volatility is inﬁnite. This is why unit-root
processes might be allowed.
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unconditionally optimal steady state, to the loss function l (xt) and
dynamic constraints EF (yt, xt, μt):
Ql =
1
2
(
X2
∂2l
∂x2
x̂tx̂t
)
;
QF =
1
2
X2
(
∂2F
∂x2
+
∂2F
∂y2
)
x̂tx̂t + XX
∂2F
∂x∂y
x̂tx̂t+1 + Xμ
∂2F
∂x∂μ
x̂tμ̂t
+ Xμ
∂2F
∂y∂μ
x̂t+1μ̂t,
where we use x̂t to denote a log-deviation from steady state.
It is straightforward to show that the maximization of the uncon-
ditional objective (19) subject to the linearized analogues of equa-
tions (2) yields the same solution as log-linearization of the ﬁrst-
order conditions (9). This latter approach is proposed by Khan,
King, and Wolman (2003) in the context of conditional optimiza-
tion, and is extended in DDN (2008) to unconditional optimization.
Implementing the above result turns out to be fairly straightforward
both from a numerical perspective and an analytical perspective.
4.1 Numerical Methodology
Any model economy can be described by the agents’ behavioral
dynamics (2) and the policy rule (3). Log-linearization of those two
equations can be presented in the form of
EtVt+1 = AVt + Bεt+1,
where Vt is the vector of endogenous variables and εt+1 is the vec-
tor of exogenous shocks. In this form it is straightforward to con-
struct the variance-covariance matrix, R ≡ EVtV ′t , using standard
software.12 That is, R is recovered by solving the following matrix
equation:
R = ARA′ + BΥB′, (20)
12For example, Dynare gives the variance-covariance matrix as part of its
standard output.
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where Υ = Eεtε′t is the unconditional variance-covariance matrix of
the underlying shock processes. Equation (20) can be solved numer-
ically using a doubling algorithm as described in Anderson et al.
(1996) using an equivalent form
R =
+∞∑
j=0
AjBΥB′A′j .
The social welfare function can be computed as a linear combination
of the elements of matrix R.
4.2 Substitution Techniques for UO and TP Policies
Although the method of pure second-order approximation (19) is
straightforward and quite eﬃcient, it may be useful to show how
one can replicate the same welfare analysis by substituting vari-
ables employing the dynamic constraints (2). In particular, it demon-
strates that even though UO policy cannot ignore initial conditions,
that does not prevent one from using a substitution approach for
UO policy analysis. Consider a second-order approximation to the
dynamic constraint equations,
x̂t+1 = αx̂t + ŷt + Qt + O3, (21)
where Qt is a pure quadratic form.
We ﬁrst discuss the TP methodology which has been impor-
tant for recovering the relationship between means and variances in
second-order approximations useful for welfare analysis.13 The TP
substitution methodology expresses the discounted sum of {x̂t+s}+∞s=0
as a function of {ŷt+s}+∞s=0 . In that case, equation (21) is integrated
forward to yield
+∞∑
s=0
βsx̂t+1+s = a
+∞∑
s=0
βsx̂t+s +
+∞∑
s=0
βsŷt+s +
+∞∑
s=0
βsQt+s + O3.
13Sutherland (2002) was the ﬁrst to apply this approach to the case of an econ-
omy with a distorted steady state and a particular policy rule. See also Kim and
Kim (2003).
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That expression can be simpliﬁed as
(
β−1 − a)+∞∑
s=0
βsx̂t+s − β−1x̂t =
+∞∑
s=0
βsŷt+s +
+∞∑
s=0
βsQt+s + O3.
Then an initial value, x̂t, is ignored as a “t.i.p.” and the ﬁnal expres-
sion appears as
+∞∑
s=0
βsx̂t+s =
1
β−1 − a
+∞∑
s=0
βsŷt+s +
1
β−1 − a
+∞∑
s=0
βsQt+s + O3.
This expression is then used to calculate approximate utility.
To deliver the analogous expression in the case of UO policy, one
applies the unconditional expectations operator to (21),
Ex̂t+1 = Eαx̂t + Eŷt + EQt + O3. (22)
Then, one uses the fact that Ex̂t+1 = Ex̂t, which transforms (22)
into
Ex̂t =
1
1 − aEŷt +
1
1 − aEQt + O3, (23)
which is the desired expression.
5. Example: Calvo Model with Distorted Steady State
A more or less canonical dynamic New Keynesian model is now
developed and two issues in particular are pursued. First, which
model variables appear in the approximate loss function under UO
policy? Second, some insight is sought into the nature of UO mon-
etary policy compared with TP policy. That comparison is pursued
further in section 7.
5.1 The Households
There is a large number of identical agents in this (closed) economy
where the only input to production is labor. Each agent evaluates
utility using the following criterion:
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E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Yt, Nt(i)) = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
log(Yt) − λ1 + v
(∫
i
Nt(i)di
)1+v)
.
(24)
Et denotes the conditional expectations operator at time t ≥ 0, β
is the discount factor, Yt is consumption, and Nt(i) is the quantity
of labor supplied to industry i; labor is industry speciﬁc. υ ≥ 0
measures the labor supply elasticity, while λ is a preference param-
eter.
Consumption is deﬁned over a Dixit-Stiglitz basket of goods,
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
θ−1
θ di
] θ
θ−1
. (25)
The average price level, Pt, is known to be
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
pt(i)1−θdi
] 1
1−θ
. (26)
The demand for each good is given by
Yt(i) =
(
pt(i)
Pt
)−θ
Y dt , (27)
where pt(i) is the nominal price of the ﬁnal good produced in indus-
try i and Y dt denotes aggregate demand.
Agents face the ﬂow constraint
PtYt + Bt = (1 + it−1)Bt−1 + (1 − τ)WtNt +Πt. (28)
As all agents are identical, the only ﬁnancial assets traded in equi-
librium will be those issued by the ﬁscal authority. Here Bt denotes
the nominal value of government bond holdings, at the end of date
t; 1 + it is the nominal interest rate on this “riskless” one-period
nominal asset; Wt is the nominal wage in period t (our assump-
tions mean that we do not need to index wages on i); and Πt indi-
cates any proﬁts remitted to the individual. It is assumed that labor
income is taxed at rate τ . The usual conditions are assumed to apply
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to the consumer’s limiting net savings behavior. Hence, necessary
conditions for an optimum include
−U
′
N (Yt, Nt)
U ′Y (Yt, Nt)
= λNvt Yt = (1 − τ)wt, (29)
wt =
λ
1 − τ N
v
t Yt, (30)
and
Et
{
βU ′Y (Yt+1, Nt+1)
U ′Y (Yt, Nt)
Pt
Pt+1
}
=
1
1 + it
. (31)
Here wt denotes the real wage. The complete-markets assumption
implies the existence of a unique stochastic discount factor,
Qt,t+k = β
YtPt
Yt+kPt+k
, (32)
where
Et {Qt,t+k} = Et
k∏
j=0
1
1 + it+j
.
5.2 Representative Firm: Factor Demand
As noted, labor is the only factor of production. Firms are monopo-
listic competitors who produce their distinctive goods according to
the following technology:
Yt(i) = At [Nt(i)]
1/φ
, (33)
where Nt(i) denotes the amount of labor hired by ﬁrm i in period t,
At is a stochastic productivity shock, and 1 < φ.
The demand for output determines the demand for labor. Hence
one ﬁnds that
Nt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−θφ(
Yt
At
)φ
. (34)
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There is an economy-wide labor market so that all ﬁrms pay the
same wage for the same labor. As a result, as asserted above, one
may write wt(i) = wt,∀i. All households provide the same share of
labor to all ﬁrms. The total amount of labor will then be
Nt =
∫
Nt(i)di =
(
Yt
At
)φ ∫ (
Pt(i)
Pt
)−θφ
di =
(
A−1t Yt
)φ
Δt, (35)
where Δt is the measure of price dispersion:
Δt ≡
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−θφ
di. (36)
5.3 Representative Firm: Price Setting
As in Calvo (1983), each period a ﬁxed proportion of randomly cho-
sen ﬁrms is allowed to adjust prices. Those ﬁrms choose the nominal
price which maximizes their expected proﬁt given that they have
to charge the same price in k periods’ time with probability αk. As
usual, we assume that ﬁrms are cost takers. Let p′t(i) denote the
choice of nominal price by a ﬁrm that is permitted to reprice in
period t.
Real proﬁts can be written as
Pt(i)
Pt
Yt(i) − μtwtNt(i), (37)
where μt is a cost-push shock so that the total cost facing ﬁrm i will
be TC(i) = μtwtNt(i). In combination with the production function,
TC(i) = μtwt
(
Yt(i)
At
)φ
, and therefore marginal cost for a particular
ﬁrm i is c(i) = φμtwt
(
Yt(i)
At
)φ
/Yt(i).
As all ﬁrms that are permitted to reprice will choose the same
price, optimal repricing implies
(
p′t
Pt
)1+θ(φ−1)
=
(
θ
θ−1
)∑∞
k=0(αβ)
kY −1t+k
×
[
φμt+kwt+kA
−φ
t+kY
φ
t+k(Pt/Pt+k)
−θφ
]
∑∞
k=0(αβ)k(Pt/Pt+k)1−θ
.
(38)
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The price index then evolves according to the law of motion,
Pt =
[
(1 − α) p′1−θt + αP 1−θt−1
]1/(1−θ)
. (39)
Because the relative prices of the ﬁrms that do not change their
prices in period t fall by the rate of inﬂation, the law of motion for
the measure of price dispersion is
Δt = αΔt−1π
θφ
t + (1 − α) (p′t/Pt)−θφ . (40)
6. UO Monetary Policy
Proposition 3 sets out the relevant UO Ramsey problem.
Proposition 3. The UO Ramsey plan is a choice of state-contingent
paths for the endogenous variables {πt+k,Δt+k, pt+k, ct+k, Xt+k,
Zt+k}∞k=0 from date t onwards given {EtAt+k, Etμt+k}∞k=0, so as
to maximize social welfare function (41) subject to constraints (42)–
(45):
maxEEt
∞∑
k=0
βk
(
log (ct+k)
φ
− v
φ
logΔt+k − (1 − τ)ct+kΔt+k
μt+k
)
,
(41)
subject to the following:
• the Phillips block
(
1 − απθ−1t
1 − α
) θφ−θ+1
1−θ
Xt =
θ
θ − 1Zt; (42)
Xt = 1 + αβEtXt+1πθ−1t+1 ; (43)
Zt = ct + αβEtZt+1π
θφ
t+1. (44)
• the law of motion of prices
Δt = αΔt−1π
θφ
t + (1 − α)
(
1 − απθ−1t
1 − α
) θφ
θ−1
. (45)
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Here ct is real marginal cost for the ﬁrm which produces out-
put Yt,
ct = φ
λ
1 − τ μtΔ
v
t
(
A−1t Yt
)(v+1)φ
; (46)
discounted marginal revenue is Xt := Et
∑∞
k=0 (βα)
k
(
Pt
Pt+k
)1−θ
;
and discounted marginal cost is Zt := Et
∑∞
k=0 (βα)
k
ct+k
(
Pt
Pt+k
)−θφ
.
6.1 The Steady State
We now turn in more detail to steady-state analysis. In appendix 1
we solve the policymaker’s problem deﬁned in proposition 3 and
establish the following result.
Proposition 4. The steady-state inﬂation is positive, π ≥ 1. Price
stability is only optimal if either β = 1 or if θ−1θ
1−τ
μ = 1 (which cor-
responds to the non-distorted steady state). Moreover, π is unique
and bounded: π ≤ min(β1/(θ−1−φθ), α−1/(φθ)).
Proof. See appendix 1.
Our result shows that UO policy delivers a diﬀerent equilibrium
inﬂation than TP optimal policy. It is well known (see Benigno and
Woodford 2005) that TP optimal policy requires price stability in the
steady state. The UO policy delivers a trend inﬂation. The intuition
follows from the fact that whilst higher inﬂation induces price-setting
ﬁrms to choose a higher markup, ﬁrms holding prices constant will
see their markup erode more quickly; one eﬀect acts to boost demand
and the other to reduce it. King and Wolman (1999) show that
a slightly positive inﬂation rate maximizes steady-state welfare by
reducing the markup distortion (inverse of marginal cost). In our
model the steady-state value of real marginal cost as a function of
inﬂation is obtained from the Phillips relation (42)–(44):
c =
1 − αβπθφ
1 − αβπθ−1
θ − 1
θ
(
1 − απθ−1
1 − α
) θφ−θ+1
1−θ
.
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It is easy to see that it increases with inﬂation at π = 1, and it
follows that
d log c
dπ
π = (θ − 1)φ
(
απθ−1 − αβπθφ
(1 − απθ−1) (1 − αβπθφ)
)
=
(θ − 1)φα(1 − β)
(1 − α) (1 − αβ) > 0.
This shows that a small increase in inﬂation will reduce the price-
to-marginal-cost ratio and reduce the monopolistic distortion in the
economy. In fact, the following proposition is true:
Proposition 5. Steady-state inﬂation increases with the distortion,
measured as 1 − θ−1θ 1−τμ , and declines in the discount factor β and
the labor elasticity, v.
Proof. See appendix 1.
Using parameter values typically found in the literature, we ﬁnd
that the optimal steady-state inﬂation is of the order of 0.2 percent
a year.
So, on the one hand, a small amount of inﬂation can boost
demand, as it partially oﬀsets the markup distortion. On the other
hand, price dispersion, which is rising in inﬂation, acts rather like
a cost shock on ﬁrms, for reasons analyzed in Damjanovic and
Nolan (2010). Hence, one ﬁnds that optimal trend inﬂation has a
U-shaped relation to price stickiness, α; it is increasing in α when
initial price dispersion is relatively small, and declines once initial
price dispersion is suﬃciently large. Optimal inﬂation declines in the
discount factor, β. As discussed DDN (2008) and emphasized ear-
lier, UO policy—in contrast to timeless-perspective policy—gives
some weight to the distribution of initial conditions. In particu-
lar, it considers the distribution of the initial output gap, which
is a time-invariant ergodic distribution imposed by chosen policy.
That is partly why some stimulation of output via inﬂation is desir-
able. So the smaller the discount factor, the higher is the relative
weight on initial conditions and the higher the optimal inﬂation
rate.
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6.1.1 Contrast to TP Policy
In the above example, UO policy exploits the Phillips curve to reduce
the markup. To understand the diﬀerence with the TP approach,
consider the following example.
Example 2. Assume that the government problem can be formulated
in terms of the following social objective:
maxEt
∞∑
k=0
βku(ct, πt),
and a price-setting constraint
Etf(ct, πt, πt+1) = 0, (47)
where ct is real marginal costs, πt is inﬂation, and u(ct, πt) is the
period social objective. Social welfare increases with c, uc > 0 and
achieves its maximum when prices are stable:
uπ(1) = 0; (48)
uππ(1) < 0. The second equation, (47), is a Phillips curve and has
the following properties:
− ∂f
∂πt
= β
∂f
∂πt+1
; (49)
∂f
∂πt
< 0;
∂f
∂ct
> 0. (50)
Equation (49) reﬂects the intertemporal trade-oﬀ between current
and future inﬂation, while (50) suggests a positive correlation
between inﬂation and marginal cost. Those properties are general
and satisﬁed in Calvo, Rotemberg, and discounted Taylor frame-
works.
The UO program is set out and solved:
HUO = u(c, π) − λf(c, π, π);
∂HUO
∂c
=
∂u
∂c
− λ∂f
∂c
= 0; (51)
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∂HUO
∂π
=
∂u
∂π
− λ
(
∂f
∂πt
+
∂f
∂πt+1
)
= 0. (52)
Since ∂u∂c > 0, and
∂f
∂c > 0, the Lagrange multiplier, λ, is positive
and the last equation can be rewritten as
∂HUO
∂π
=
∂u
∂π
+ λ(1 − β) ∂f
∂πt+1
= 0.
Therefore, in equilibrium there is a positive inﬂation, π > 1, since
∂u
∂π < 0.
Unconditional optimization uses positive inﬂation to reduce the
markup, which is equivalent to increasing steady-state marginal cost.
The implicit function theorem is applied to the price-setting equa-
tion to show that
dc
dπ
= −
(
∂f
∂πt
+
∂f
∂πt+1
)/
∂f
∂ct
= (1 − β) ∂f
∂πt+1
/
∂f
∂ct
> 0,
and this is exploited in order to improve welfare.
The TP approach, on the other hand, ignores the relation
between inﬂation and marginal costs in the Phillips curve and does
not use inﬂation to stimulate the economy by reducing the ineﬃcient
markup. The TP program and solution is
LTP = Et
∞∑
k=0
βk (u(ct+k, πt+k) − λt+kEtf(ct+k, πt+k, πt+1+k)) ;
∂LTP
∂ct
=
∂u
∂c
− λt∂f
∂c
= 0;
∂LTP
∂πt+1
=
∂u
∂π
− λt+1β ∂f
∂πt
− λt ∂f
∂πt+1
= 0. (53)
Combining (49) with (53) in steady state shows that TP pol-
icy chooses inﬂation to optimize intertemporal utility in the steady
state:
∂u
∂π
= 0.
It is apparent that the eﬀect of inﬂation on the reduction of the price
markup is not utilized when TP optimization is applied.
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Finally, we note that price stability only occurs under the TP if
conditions (48) and (49) are satisﬁed when the price setting is one
period forward looking. In a more general case, if the Phillips rela-
tion should satisfy
∑∞
k=−∞ β
−k ∂f
∂πt+1
= 0, that may not be so for a
wide range of models. For example, it may not be the case for an
open economy (see Benigno and Lopez-Salido 2006).
6.2 The Quadratic Form
Having recovered the optimal steady state, one can obtain a quad-
ratic loss function of the form (19). The quadratic welfare derived
from (41) and constraints (42)–(45) is
EU = −1
2
E
(
hΦû2t + (1 − hΦ)ĉ2t + ΛxX̂2t + Λππ̂t2 + ΛΔΔ̂2t
)
,
(54)
where ût = ĉt + Δ̂t − μ̂t is the log-linearized disutility of labor,
ut = −λN
v+1
t
v+1 .
For the model at hand, one can show that it can be written as
follows:
EU= −1
2
E
[
φ (1 + v)
(
Ŷt − Ŷ ∗t
)2
+ Gĝ2t + ΛxX̂
2
t + ΛΔΔ̂
2
t + Λππ̂t
2
]
,
(55)
where ĝt = μ̂t − Δ̂t. ĝt has an intuitive interpretation as the log-
deviation of the ratio of natural output to labor cost. To see that,
note that if prices were ﬂexible (α = 0), the price-setting condition
(38) will result in the following level of output:
Y nt =
θ
θ − 1
μt
Δt
φwtNt. (56)
Therefore, if we deﬁne gt :=
Y nt
wtNt
= φ θθ−1
μt
Δt
, that becomes a
relationship between the log-deviation of the cost-push shock and
relative price dispersion.
The term Ŷ ∗t represents the “target” level of output Y
∗
t :=
Ât−vμμ̂t−vΔΔ̂t. Details concerning coeﬃcients are given in appen-
dix 2. The “target” rate is increasing in productivity and declining in
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the cost-push shock; it is also declining in price dispersion. The vari-
able X̂t represents the losses to ﬁrms forced to charge sub-optimal
prices due to price stickiness and expected inﬂation, to which they
may not be able to react.
This form of the loss function can easily be nested to familiar
cases, either the non-distorted steady state where Φ = 1, or where
the steady state of the model economy remains distorted but where
the social discount rate is equal to the private rate of discount,
β = 1 (in which case the UO policy and the timeless-perspective
policies coincide). In both special cases, optimal monetary policy
corresponds to price stability, and the loss function (55) reduces to
a familiar form deﬁned simply over inﬂation and output. Speciﬁcally,
if the optimal steady state is characterized by price stability, then
Λx = 0. Moreover, one can easily show that price dispersion, Δ̂t,
is a second-order term in that case. Lastly, the labor wedge ĝt is
then simply a cost-push shock, μ̂t, and can be considered as a term
independent of policy.
7. Application: Unconditional Ordering of Simple Rules
The foregoing approach is easily used to evaluate simple rules for
monetary policy and to highlight the potential signiﬁcance for pol-
icy design of a distorted steady state. First, write the model in vector
autoregressive form as follows:
Etπ̂t+1 + EtŶt+1 = Ŷt + (1 − β)̂it; (57)
βαπθφEt
(
Ẑt+1 + θφπ̂t+1
)
= Ẑt −
(
1 − αβπθφ) ĉt; (58)
βαπθ−1Et
(
X̂t+1 + (θ − 1) π̂t+1
)
= X̂t; (59)
Ẑt − (θφ − θ + 1) απ
θ−1
1 − απθ−1 π̂t − X̂t = 0; (60)
−ĝt +Δ̂t − μ̂t = 0; (61)
−ĉt + vΔ̂t + (v + 1)φ(Ŷt − Ât)+ μ̂t = 0; (62)
Δ̂t+1 + θφ
απθ−1 − aπθφ
1 − απθ−1 π̂t+1 = aπ
θφΔ̂t; (63)
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−Y ∗t + Ât − vμμ̂t − vΔΔ̂t = 0; (64)
−ît = φππ̂t + φf f̂t + mt. (65)
In the above linearized system of equations, the ﬁnal equation
(65) is the policy rule, where ît is the gross nominal interest rate,
ît = log
(
β
π (1 + it)
)
, and f̂t represents a linear combination of policy
feedback variables, while mt is a policy shock.14
It is clear that steady-state distortions complicate the policy
problem so far as the policymaker’s objective function is con-
cerned.15 However, does it make any diﬀerence so far as the design
of simple rules are concerned?16
First, a simple interest rate feedback rule is considered, where the
interest rate responds to current and lagged inﬂation only. The feed-
back on current inﬂation is ﬁxed at φπ = 1.5. Given this, the opti-
mized weight on lagged inﬂation, f = π̂t−1, is computed. It is about
15 in the distorted steady-state case and 14 for the non-distorted
steady state. However, the diﬀerence in welfare between responding
and not responding to lagged inﬂation is up to 0.16 percentage points
in terms of consumption-equivalent units (see the top-right graph in
ﬁgure 1; φf is at its optimal value). As in the TP approach, relative
price distortion is very costly, and the optimal simple rule may be
very close to price stability (φπ = +∞). However, if for any reason
the policy reaction on current inﬂation is restricted, the economy
may signiﬁcantly beneﬁt from a response to lagged inﬂation.
One can also show that the optimal feedback on output should
be slightly negative, φf = −0.015. Furthermore, inclusion of real
output targeting leads to very modest welfare improvements, in the
14The following parameterization is used in the quantitative investigation:
β = 0.9, v = 1.1, θ = 7, α = 0.5, and φ = 1.3. It is assumed that shocks At, μt, and
mt follow AR(1) processes with ρA = 0.98, σA = 0.008, ρm = 0.9, σm = 0.005,
and ρμ = 0.9, σμ = 0.02.
15That is, complicates it relative to the objective function in the non-distorted
case.
16In the particular model developed above, the UO trend inﬂation is rather
small and the policy ordering across distorted and non-distorted steady states is
often the same for given simple rules. However, in simulations not reported, it
was possible to ﬁnd simple, plausible rules that result in welfare “reversals”; that
is, where rule 1 welfare dominates rule 2 in the distorted economy, but where the
ranking switched in the non-distorted economy.
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order of 10−3 compared with targeting inﬂation alone. This result is
consistent with Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007).
The results are summed up in ﬁgure 1 (where the broken line is
the non-distorted economy).
7.0.1 Targeting Nominal Income Growth
Finally, inﬂation targeting and nominal income targeting are com-
pared under a UO policy criterion as in Kim and Henderson (2005).
Kim and Henderson suggest, in a model with one-period price stick-
iness, that nominal income targeting may have superior welfare
properties to inﬂation targeting. Two rules are compared:
Nominal income growth targeting: it = 0.05 (yt − yt−1 + πt) (66)
+ (φπ − 0.05)πt + mt;
Inﬂation targeting: it = φππt + mt. (67)
In the case of a non-distorted steady state and a “low” feedback
on inﬂation, the ﬁndings are similar to some of Kim and Hender-
son’s ﬁndings. Speciﬁcally, in the case of a distorted steady-state
model, the net welfare gain from targeting nominal income growth
over inﬂation targeting is positive. In the non-distorted case, inﬂa-
tion targeting is rarely dominated by nominal income targeting.
In ﬁgure 2, the relative welfare gain (over inﬂation targeting) in
targeting nominal income growth is plotted against φπ.
The precise position of these net welfare schedules is quite sensi-
tive to parameterization of the model (in particular, the persistence
of shocks), but in general one ﬁnds that as the feedback on inﬂa-
tion rises, inﬂation targeting is likely to dominate nominal income
targeting.
7.1 Comparing Optimal Policies
In this section we compare impulse responses when UO and TP
policies are applied. The linear approximation to UO policy looks
rather complex. It has three predetermined variables; besides inﬂa-
tion, there is price dispersion Δt and the Lagrange multiplier associ-
ated with one of the dynamic constraints (43). The complete system
is presented in appendix 2. The TP policy system breaks naturally
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Figure 2. Relative Welfare Gain in Targeting Nominal
Income Growth
into blocks, and the dynamics for inﬂation and marginal cost can
be solved from these two-equation blocks as shown in appendix 2.
However, due to the fact that β is very close to 1, we do not expect
to see quantitatively a large diﬀerence across TP and UO policy.
Note that {(41), (42)–(45)} does not include the productivity
shock. Hence, one may conclude that neither UO nor TP policy
should react to such shocks and that price/inﬂation stability will be
optimal under both policies. Below we report the impulse responses
from TP and UO policies following a cost-push shock. We ran two
experiments, one with persistent (ρμ = 0.9) and one with non-
persistent (ρμ = 0) shocks.17
Strict inﬂation targeting is sub-optimal under both approaches
when a markup shock hits the economy. When the shock has low
persistence, one observes overshooting in inﬂation, although this is
absent when the shock is persistent. Perhaps the key point to observe
is that when the shock is persistent, UO policy implies a slow rate
of convergence of inﬂation.
Not surprisingly, perhaps, for the baseline New Keynesian model
we ﬁnd that the diﬀerences between TP and UO policies are small.
In ﬁgure 3, they generate very similar responses in output to a cost-
push shock, but slightly diﬀerent responses in inﬂation. When the
17Let ρμ denote the autocorrelation coeﬃcient; then the shock process that is
posited is described by μt = ρμμt−1 + εt, where εt˜N(0, 1) is an i.i.d. shock.
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Figure 3. UO and TP-Optimal Policies
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shock is persistent, it aﬀects the economy for a longer period of
time, and the diﬀerence in social time discounting becomes more
important in that case.
Finally, one observes that the price level returns to its ini-
tial value after the shocks under TP policy but not following UO
policy. Thus, UO policy induces inﬁnite variability in the price
level (although inﬂation is stationary), whilst TP gives a stationary
price.18
8. Conclusion
In this paper we analyze UO policies and compare them with TP
policies. UO policy in spirit is actually very similar to the deﬁnition
given when TP policy was introduced in Woodford (1999a, p. 19):
“under the timeless perspective, one chooses to act as one believes
one would have wished to commit oneself to act at a date far in the
past.” The TP acknowledges that commitment results in more favor-
able expectations (which are considered, in eﬀect, as state variables).
18We thank the editor for highlighting this ﬁnding in our results.
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But whilst the TP recognizes that expectations can be changed by
a particular policy implementation and that that eﬀect should be
internalized, it rejects the notion that policy aﬀects the distribution
of the other state variables (like capital) and that that inﬂuence
ought to be internalized also. So we think of the UO perspective
pushing the original intuition for the TP one step further: One
chooses to act as one believes one would have wished to commit one-
self to act at a date far in the past not only with respect to private
expectations but with respect to other state variables like capital.
The paper also demonstrates that one can formulate a purely
quadratic approximate unconditional loss function to a model econ-
omy with a distorted steady state. It develops a straightforward,
eﬃcient approach to implementing the UO approach. It contrasts
this approach to policy formulation with the TP approach, giving a
number of examples where policies and objectives diﬀer. It explores
reasons why one may be interested in pursuing UO policies and the
diﬃculties so encountered. In an application, it is shown that the
loss function may be somewhat more complex than in a model with
no steady-state distortions; inﬂation and output are no longer the
sole arguments in the loss function. However, the loss function so
obtained is easily interpreted in terms of the underlying distortions
in the economy.
Appendix 1. A Second-Order Approximation of the
Welfare Function
The ﬁrst part of this appendix demonstrates the key result in section
4, namely the existence of the quadratic form, (19). The ﬁrst line of
the following block of equations corresponds to the top line of (19),
the subsequent lines being its quadratic approximation:
El (xt) = E [l (xt) + ξF (yt, xt, μt)]
= E
(
l + X
∂l
∂x
x̂t +
1
2
(
X2
∂2l
∂x2
+ X
∂l
∂x
)
x̂tx̂t
)
+ Eξ
(
F + X
∂F
∂x
x̂t + X
∂F
∂y
ŷt + μ
∂F
∂μ
μ̂t
)
+
1
2
ξ
(
X
∂F
∂x
+ X2
∂2F
∂x2
)
Ex̂tx̂t +
1
2
ξ
(
X
∂F
∂y
+ XX
∂F
∂y2
)
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× Eŷtŷt + 12ξ
(
μ
∂F
∂x
+ μ2
∂2F
∂x2
)
Eμ̂tμ̂t
+ ξE
(
XX
∂F
∂x∂y
x̂tŷt + Xμ
∂2F
∂x∂μ
x̂tμ̂t + Xμ
∂F
∂y∂μ
ŷtμ̂t
)
+ O3.
Using the constraints Etxt+1 = yt, and the property of unconditional
expectations that Ezt+1 = Ezt, this can be rewritten as
El (xt) = XEx̂t
(
∂l
∂x
+ ξ
∂F
∂x
+ ξ
∂F
∂y
)
+
1
2
XEx̂tx̂t
(
∂l
∂x
+ ξ
∂F
∂x
+ ξ
∂F
∂y
)
+ EQl + ξEQF (68)
+ l + ξF + ξμ
∂F
∂μ
Eμ̂t +
1
2
ξ
(
μ
∂F
∂x
+ μ2
∂2F
∂x2
)
Eμ̂tμ̂t
+ O3. (69)
Here Ql and QF are pure second-order terms:
Ql =
1
2
X2
∂2l
∂x2
x̂tx̂t;
QF =
1
2
X2
(
∂2F
∂x2
+
∂2F
∂y2
)
x̂tx̂t + XX
∂2F
∂x∂y
x̂tx̂t+1 + Xμ
∂2F
∂x∂μ
x̂tμ̂t
+ Xμ
∂2F
∂y∂μ
x̂t+1μ̂t.
Furthermore, using the steady-state conditions (11), one can show
that the ﬁrst line of expression (68) equals zero. Moreover, expres-
sion (69) consists of l + ξF = l, the steady-state value of the loss
function and shocks. These are terms independent of policy (t.i.p.).
Thus, it is proved that the loss function can be represented in a pure
quadratic form.
El (xt) = EQl + ξEQF + t.i.p+ O3.
UO Policy in a Distorted Calvo Model
In this section we apply the algorithm designed in the main text
to the Calvo model summarized in section 6. One can set up
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the Hamiltonian for this problem, as proposed in section 2.1.1, as
follows:
H =
(
log (ct) − v logΔt − Δt θ
θ − 1Φct
)
+ ρt
(
Xt − 1 − βαπθ−1t+1 Xt+1
)
+ ϕt
(
−Zt + ct + αβEtZt+1πθφt+1.
)
+ ξt
⎛
⎝(1 − απθ−1t
1 − α
) θφ−θ+1
1−θ
Xt − θ
θ − 1Zt
⎞
⎠
+ ηt
⎛
⎝Δt − αΔt−1πθφt − (1 − α)
(
1 − απθ−1t
1 − α
) θφ
θ−1
⎞
⎠ .
The necessary conditions for an optimum include
∂H
∂ct
=
1
ct
− θ
θ − 1ΦΔt + ϕt;
∂H
∂Δt
= − v
Δt
− θ
θ − 1Φct + ηt − Etαηt+1π
θφ
t+1;
∂H
∂Xt
= ρt − ρt−1βαπθ−1t + ξt
(
1 − απθ−1t
1 − α
) θφ−θ+1
1−θ
;
∂H
∂Zt
= −ϕt + ϕt−1βαπθφt − ξt
θ
θ − 1;
πt
∂H
∂πt
= − (θ − 1) ρt−1βαπθ−1t Xt + ϕt−1βαθφπθφt Zt
+ ξtXt (θφ − θ + 1)
(
1 − απθ−1t
1 − α
) θφ
1−θ
α
1 − aπ
θ−1
t
− ηtαθφΔt−1πθφt + ηtθφαπθ−1t
(
1 − απθ−1t
1 − α
) θφ−θ+1
θ−1
.
(70)
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Optimal Steady State
The value of the endogenous variables in steady state should solve
the system of constraints (42)–(45) and the ﬁrst-order conditions,
(70). As a result, one obtains the following steady-state equations:
X = 11−βαπθ−1 ;
[
ΦΔ − ϕθ−1θ
]
θ
θ−1c = 1;
Z = θ−1θ X
(
1−απθ−1t
1−α
) θφ−θ+1
1−θ
; ηΔ
(
1 − απθφ) = (v + θθ−1ΦΔc) ;
c =
(
1 − αβπθφ)Z; ξ = −ϕθ−1θ (1 − αβπθφ) ;
Δ =
(
1−α
1−απθφ
)(
1−απθ−1t
1−α
) θφ
θ−1
; ρ = −ξ
(
1−απθ−1t
1−α
) θφ−θ+1
1−θ
X.
(71)
For further convenience, we will compute the steady-state value
of the Lagrange multipliers
ρ = Φh − 1 < 0;
ηΔ
(
1 − απθφ) = v +Φh,
where we deﬁned h := 1−απ
θ−1
1−απθφ
1−αβπθφ
1−βαπθ−1 . The last ﬁrst-order condi-
tion (70) provides an equation to ﬁnd optimal inﬂation,
0 = [1 − Φh]φθ
(
βαπθφ
(1 − αβπθφ) −
απθ−1
1 − απθ−1
)
+ [1 − Φh] (θ − 1)
(
απθ−1t
1 − απθ−1t
− βαπ
θ−1
1 − βαπθ−1
)
+ [v +Φh] θφ
(
απθ−1
1 − απθ−1 −
απθφ
(1 − απθφ)
)
. (72)
Using these equations, one can infer certain properties of the
optimal steady-state inﬂation rate.
Proof of Proposition 4: Existence
One may rewrite (72) as (73):
F (π) = vg(π) + [g(π) − f(π)] + Φh(π)f(π) = 0, (73)
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where h(π) = 1−αβπ
θφ
1−αβπθ−1
1−απθ−1
1−απθφ > 0, and g(π) =
θφ
1−απθφ − θφ1−απθ−1 ;
f(π) =
[
θφ
1−απθφ − θφ1−αβπθφ
]
−
[
θ−1
1−απθ−1 − θ−11−βαπθ−1
]
; Φ = θ−1θ
1−τ
μ .
It is easy to see that g(1) = 0; h(1) = 1 and
f(1) = (θφ−θ+1)α(1−β)(1−a)(1−αβ) > 0, which implies that F (1) =
− (1 − Φ) (θφ−θ+1)α(1−β)(1−a)(1−αβ) ≤ 0. The strict equality obtains in three
cases only: ﬁrst, when prices are ﬂexible, α = 0; second, when the
future is not discounted by ﬁrms, β = 1; and ﬁnally, when there are
no distortions in steady state, Φ = 1.
Deﬁne πh = α−1/(φθ) and note that the functions g, f , and h
are deﬁned on an interval [1, πh). The diﬀerence [g(πh) − f(πh)]
is bounded while g(π), h(π), and f(π) tend to positive inﬁnity
as π approaches πh. Hence, lim
π−→πh
F (π) = +∞. Since F (π) is
a continuous function, one can conclude that there is a solution
to (73) on the interval [1, α−1/(φθ)). One may easily show then
that if πm = β1/(θ−1−φθ), then it follows that F (πm) > 0, since
g(πm)− f(πm) > 0. Therefore, optimal inﬂation is smaller than πm.
Proof of Proposition 4: Uniqueness
The proof is by contradiction. First it is proved that if β < 1, for
any π1 < πm such that F (π1) = 0, it is necessary that F ′(π1) > 0.
By direct diﬀerentiation, it follows that
F ′(π1) = (v + 1) g′(π1) + (Φh(π1) − 1) f ′(π1) + Φh′(π1)f(π1).
Moreover, since F (π1) = 0, it follows that Φh(π1) − 1 =
− (v + 1) g(π1)/f(π1). Therefore,
F ′(π1) =
(v + 1)
f(π1)
[g′(π1)f(π1) − f ′(π1)g(π1)] + Φh′(π1)f(π1),
and it is easy to show that for any π1 < πm, g′(π1)f(π1) −
f ′(π1)g(π1) > 0, and therefore F ′(π1) is positive.
Since F is continuously diﬀerentiable, if a solution of (73) is not
unique, there will be at least one solution such that F ′(π1) ≤ 0. It
has been demonstrated that such a solution is impossible and the
necessary contradiction is obtained.
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Proof of Proposition 5
By the implicit function theorem, one concludes that dπdΦ = −∂F∂π /∂F∂Φ .
From the proof of proposition 4 (uniqueness), we know that ∂F∂π > 0,
while ∂F∂Φ = h(π)f(π) > 0. Therefore
dπ
dΦ < 0, and equilibrium
inﬂation increases with steady-state distortions, measured as 1−Φ.
Similarly, dπdv = −∂F∂π /∂F∂v , where ∂F∂v = g(π) > 0 for π > 1, there-
fore dπdv < 0, and optimal inﬂation declines with the elasticity of
labor.
Moreover, dπdβ = −∂F∂π /∂F∂β , where ∂F∂β = − (1 − Φh(π)) ∂f∂β +
Φf(π)∂h∂β , and one may prove by direct diﬀerentiation that
∂f
∂β < 0,
∂ lnh
∂β > 0, and (1 − Φh(π)) = (v + 1) g(π)/f(π) > 0. Therefore,
∂F
∂β > 0, and
dπ
dβ < 0.
Finally, it is worth noting that steady-state inﬂation can both
increase or decrease in price stickiness, since the sign of ∂F∂α may be
positive or negative.
Appendix 2. The Second-Order Approximation to
Unconditional Welfare
In section 6.2 of the main text, we asserted the existence of the
following quadratic equation:
EU = E (Ql + ρQX + ϕQZ + ξQZX + ηQΔ) ,
where Ql is the second-order term of the loss function and QX , QZ ,
QZX , QΔ, and Qp are the second-order terms of the log-linear
approximation to constraints in the above Hamiltonian. We out-
line here the key manipulations required to derive these expressions.
A more detailed appendix is available upon request. For optimal π,
they can be written as
Ql = −12 ĉ
2
t +
1
2
vΔ̂2t −
1
2
θ
θ − 1ΦcΔ
(
2ĉtΔ̂t − 2ĉtμ̂t − 2μ̂tΔ̂t
)
+ tip;
(74)
Qx = − (θ − 1)βαπθ−1X
[
X̂tπ̂t +
1
2
(θ − 2) π̂2t
]
; (75)
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Qz = θφβαπθφZ
(
Ẑtπ̂t +
1
2
(θφ − 1) π̂2t
)
; (76)
Qzx = (θφ − θ + 1)X
(
1 − απθ−1
1 − α
) θφ
1−θ απθ−1
1 − α X̂tπ̂t
+
1
2
X
(θφ − θ + 1)απθ−1
1 − α
(
1 − απθ−1
1 − α
) θφ
1−θ
×
[
θφαπθ−1
1 − απθ−1 + θ − 2
]
π̂2t ; (77)
QΔ = −θφαΔπθφ
(
Δ̂t−1π̂t +(θφ − 1)12 π̂
2
t
)
θφαπθ−1
(
1 − απθ−1t
1 − α
)θφ
θ−1−1
×
(
−(θφ − θ + 1)απ
θ−1
1 − απθ−1t
+ θ − 2
)
1
2
π̂2t . (78)
The linear relations are
X̂t − βαπθ−1
(
X̂t+1 + (θ − 1) π̂t+1
)
= O2; (79)
Ẑt −
(
1 − αβπθφ) ĉt − βαπθφ (Ẑt+1 + θφπ̂t+1) = O2; (80)
Ẑt −
(
X̂t + (θφ − θ + 1) απ
θ−1
1 − απθ−1t
π̂t
)
= O2; (81)
−Δ̂t + απθφΔ̂t−1 + θφ
(
απθφ − απθ−1
1 − απθ−1
)
π̂t = O2. (82)
Simpliﬁcation of QΔ
Use (82) to derive an expression for Δ̂2t . From that we ﬁnd an
expression for the cross term π̂tΔ̂t−1:
Eαπθφθφπ̂tΔ̂t−1 = E
1
2
(
απθφ − απθ−1
1 − απθ−1
)−1 (
1 − (απθφ)2) Δ̂2t
− 1
2
(θφ)2
(
απθφ − απθ−1
1 − απθ−1
)
π̂2t .
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Then, substitute that into (78) to conclude that
EQΔη = −12
(
1 − απθ−1) (1 + απθφ)
απθφ − απθ−1 (v +Φh)EΔ̂
2
t + θφ
(v +Φh)
1 − απθ−1
×
[
(θ − 1 − θφ) απ
θ−1
1 − απθ−1 +
απθφ − απθ−1
1 − απθφ
]
1
2
Eπ̂2t .
(83)
Simpliﬁcation of Qz
Using (81) in (76) results in
ϕQz = ρ
θφβαπθφ
1 − αβπθφ
(
X̂tπ̂t + (θφ − θ + 1) απ
θ−1
1 − απθ−1t
π̂2t
+
1
2
(θφ − 1) π̂2t
)
. (84)
Computing the Final Quadratic Form
We use the steady-state relation among Lagrange multipliers (71)
and quadratic forms (74), (75), (77), (83), and (84) to write
EU = −E 1
2
ΛΔΔ̂2t −
1
2
(1 − hΦ)ĉ2t −
1
2
hΦ
(
ĉt + Δ̂t − μ̂t
)2
;
− E
(
ΛxπX̂tπ̂t +
1
2
Λπππ̂t
2
)
. (85)
In that expression, parameters are gathered in the Λ-terms.
For example, ΛΔ =
(
1−απθ−1απθφ
απθφ−απθ−1
)
(v +Φh) . Finally, we exploit
the linear relation (79) to ﬁnd an expression for the cross term
EX̂tπ̂t: EX̂2t =
(
βαπθ−1
)2
E
(
X̂t+1 + (θ − 1) π̂t+1
)2
and EX̂tπ̂t =
−12 (θ − 1)Eπ̂2t+1 + 12
1−(βαπθ−1)2
(θ−1)(βαπθ−1)2EX̂
2
t . Hence, one recovers
EU = −1
2
E
(
hΦ
(
ĉt + Δ̂t − μ̂t
)2
+ (1 − hΦ)ĉ2t
+ ΛxX̂2t + Λππ̂t
2 + ΛΔΔ̂2t
)
. (86)
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Alternative Presentation
There are alternative ways to compose the quadratic criterion. Recall
that ct is marginal cost deﬁned in (46):
ĉt = μ̂t + vΔ̂t + (v + 1)φ
(
Ŷt − Ât
)
. (87)
The ﬁrst two terms in the quadratic loss function (86) can be sim-
pliﬁed, deﬁning Y ∗t , ĝt, and G as
Y ∗t := Ât − vμμ̂t − vΔΔ̂t;
G := hΦ (1 − hΦ) ; vμ := 1 − hΦ(v + 1)φ ; vΔ :=
v + hΦ
(v + 1)φ
;
ĝt : =Δ̂t−μ̂t.
Thus (86) becomes
EU= −1
2
E
[
φ (1 + v)
(
Ŷt − Ŷ ∗t
)2
+ Gĝ2t + ΛxX̂
2
t + ΛΔΔ̂
2
t + Λππ̂t
2
]
.
(88)
Linear Approximation to UO Policy
This is constructed by approximating the relevant ﬁrst-order con-
ditions around the steady state deﬁned in section 6.1. Details are
available upon request.
Linear Approximation to TP-Optimal Policy
For the most part, these derivations, although a little involved in
places, are straightforward. Details are available upon request.
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